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Why China is no longer Taiwan's 'enemy'
Barry Pearton, Publisher, ATI Magazine
24-02-2010
ATI December 2009
TAIPEI — Just in case you missed it (as we did), Taiwan’s ruling political party, the Kuomintang has quietly shelved its unification policy with Mainland China. It happened in the early 1990s, according to Chien-Min Chao, Deputy Minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, which is ultimately responsible for all Taiwan dealings with the Mainland.
Chao says it was then that the KMT declared the Mainland was no longer considered a rebellious organisation, reversing a law first invoked in 1949. That was when troops led by Chiang Kai-Shek fled the advancing armies of Mao-Tse Tung to take over a puppet government
actually established by China (by Chiang) in Taipei two years earlier – to fill a power vacuum left by the post-war departure (1945) of the Japanese.
“In the early 1990s, China stopped being the enemy,” Chao told ATI. Unification certainly had been KMT policy till then, but the national unification guidelines were rewritten in 1993, says Chao, adding that the matter of unification is “quite complicated”. “In theory,” he says, it (unification) is still there, because you still need to cater (for possibilities), but, in reality, the whole policy is very different from the past.
Right now, I would not say that unification is our policy, nor would I say that we have abandoned unification – I would not put it that way.
“What I would say is that unification is not our option – but unification at due time in the future may be possible, if future generations find it realistic, peaceable enough. If China is a democracy in the future, then future generations on both sides may find (unification) a good policy. Then so be it.”
Chao is playing to two audiences here. One is domestic – those in Taiwan who fear that the current KMT rapprochement with China, and the pace of that rapprochement, will inevitably see Taiwan subsumed into the greater China economy to a point where there is unification – and a loss of Taiwan sovereignty.
The other audience is made up of governments in the region and around the world with whom Taiwan yearns for a closer relationship – governments who, for decades, have scorned the Taiwanese mantra that its leadership is the legitimate government of China, while at the same time fearing diplomatic sanction from an increasingly-powerful Beijing should they extend a special hand of friendship to Taipei.
Chao takes the issue head-on. “Some people are complaining that our policy is one for unification, but that is ludicrous,” he says. “If you open a map, you will see that China is huge, 230 times larger in terms of territory, nearly 70 times larger than our population. How in the world can we initiate a process of reunification?
“So this is nonsense – my Government’s policy is that we have to be realistic, that there is a new situation in the world, a new East Asia.
“A new world has emerged in the past 20 years where we see more economic liberalisation, a lot more regionalisation, each country lowering its barriers and raising free trade so that their national livelihoods can be better served. But there are a few exceptions to this – and Taiwan is obviously one of them.
“We have not been able to participate in this huge wave of opening up because of just one problem – the Beijing authorities. We can no longer afford to be excluded, passed over, as we have in the past few years. We want very much to become part of the international process.
“We don’t want to be part of the
so-called ‘Sinosisation’ process – that’s China’s problem. “We want to be part of the regional
(and international) economic process, and China, fortunately or unfortunately, is a very
big part of this regional economic process – it is taking the lead.”
At the heart of Taiwan’s immediate dilemma is the signing of ASEAN+1, a Free Trade Agreement between ASEAN and China which becomes effective from January 1, 2010, and will create an effective tariff wall of between
six and 10 per cent on all Taiwanese exports
to these countries. As around 40 per cent of all Taiwan exports are sold into China (12 per cent through Hong Kong), and 15 per cent to ASEAN countries, Taiwan needs a remedy.
This is at hand in the form of an Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA), expected to be signed with mainland China in the first half of 2010. Although there have been sticking points, with Taiwan apparently pushing for agreement on more agenda items than China would want at this point, both sides have indicated that an agreement is near.
And while ECFA is defined by both as
strictly an economic framework, there is no doubt that, in wider political terms, it will be the most important document the Kuomintang has signed since its darkest days of 1949.
The imprimatur of China will open the door for Taiwan to seek its own FTAs with ASEAN, initially, probably, with individual members of ASEAN, and also allow more relaxed relations with other governments on a political, bilateral level. On the global stage, Taiwan has also been seeking representation at the Copenhagen climate change conference in December, and will seek membership of groups such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).
Chao told ATI the Government’s reasoning is that, by reducing tensions and cultivating better relations with the Mainland, Taiwan can remove Mainland objections to a greater international role for Taiwan. “We understand there might still be problems – there might still be daunting problems – but the obstruction, the obstacles coming from mainland China can be lessened, and have been lessened in the past 16 or 17 months since this Government came to power.
“In this time, the Government has been able to participate more actively in international activities to some extent as a result of relaxation of relations between the two sides. This year, our chief delegate to APEC was former Vice President Lien Chan. It is the second time he has led the delegation – this was not possible some years ago.
“This year we got observer membership of WHO, which is another case in point – what I am saying is that better relations between the two sides have enabled us to reduce the obstruction coming from Mainland China, so, of course, after signing ECFA with China, we are hopeful – and we have reason to be optimistic – that our national visibility, not only in international economic agreements but in other sectors, might also make headway.”
Chao agrees with the suggestion that ECFA has major implications for Taiwan’s relationship with other countries – and that it will open doors that are now closed for Taiwan. “We hope so, yes,” he told ATI.
“As a result of inking EFCA with China, we are hopeful that our chances for participation in the regional integration process can be improved – especially with regard to the extensive FTAs that have been signed unilaterally and multilaterally in ASEAN – so basically we are talking about economic participation in this region. We would very much like to sign similar agreements with the 10 ASEAN countries.
“And I am sure your country (Australia) as well. It is just that, right now, whenever we approach potential counterparts, they always bring up these shadowy issues. So that is why we think ECFA will be seen as part of the regional process.”
Taiwan’s preference, says Chao, would be to actually join ASEAN+1, but he concedes that this will not be easy, and that individual agreements are more likely. “ASEAN+1 is a collective agreement, and there is a lot of politics in it, so we don’t mind signing agreements with individual members,” he says, adding that, in two years time, ASEAN+1 may well become ASEAN+3. “It is very likely that Japan and Korea have already signed agreements with the 10 ASEAN countries, and, of course, we would like to be part of that process.”
ECFA will be signed off by China’s ARATS (Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait) and Taiwan’s SEF (Straits Exchange Foundation). Chao refers to the SEF and
ARATS as a ‘quasi-official intermediary channel” between Taiwan and the Mainland.
As has happened in negotiations on the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between China and Hong Kong, discussions
on devolvement of ECFA are expected to be ongoing.
Says Chao: “ECFA is going to be a gradual step-by-step process. In the beginning, only a few hundred items will be part of the so-called ‘early harvest’ programme.”
Chao adds that, at this point, discussions are strictly at the economic co-operation level. Asked if Cross-Strait security issues have been raised, Chao says: “No, we are still at the stage of building confidence between the two sides. “Tensions have been there for too long. For six decades, the two sides have engaged in nothing but confrontation, so right now there is not the time – there is just too much animosity. There is a long history, a long list of matters at issue.
“We are in the very beginning stage, trying to reverse the adverse relations, and we understand there is a long way ahead. As for bigger political issues, such as a peace accord and confidence building, how to rectify the political domain between the two sides, so to speak, that is another story, we think it is too early to talk about that.
“If we were to activate the political process now, all those good (economic) things we want to promote would become compromised. I don’t think either side would like to see that happen.”
Chao rejects outright any suggestion that the integration of Hong Kong into China establishes a precedent for Taiwan. “Taiwan,” he says, “is no Hong Kong. Hong Kong is something else. Hong Kong is owned by China and was ceded to Great Britain for 150 years. It was bound to be returned to China.
“In the future, we are going to see much
closer trade and economic ties between Taiwan and the Mainland, but one issue that sets the two sides apart is a very different political system, and, with it, comes the value system, cultural affairs and so on.
“The two sides remain oceans away – there is a huge gap, and there is no way the two sides could become close before mainland China is transformed into, say, a democracy, which would make the two sides more compatible economically, and importantly, politically and culturally.
“My personal opinion is that we are going to see China change to a more pluralistic society. There is no way China can resist a kind of democratisation for much longer – there is just simply a huge transition ahead, and they need to take care of that transition first.
“China might be an economic superpower already in the world, but in the end, they still have to make that transformation and the two sides will just have to cope with that transition. Then we will see what happens.
“We have been able to come up with the first democracy in any Chinese country, and while many people in China will say this is irrelevant, our traditions born of the Taiwan experience are very different.
“First, we have a very equitable society. The gap between rich and small is very small. The backbone of our economy is the SME. The gap between rich and poor is much larger in China, so they cannot continue the same line that Western capitalism is irrelevant in mainland China, that China is unique and has a different culture, because we, Taiwan, have a better Chinese culture than they do.
“Since President Ma took office last year,
I have talked to quite a few people from the Mainland, and I have not heard anyone
complaining about Taiwan’s lousy democracy.
I do hear people from the Mainland talking about the merits and achievements of Taiwan – because we have been able to make very
meaningful achievements in the context of Chinese history. So while some people see Taiwan’s future as like Hong Kong in the past – that Taiwan is moving gradually into the Chinese mainland, and is being sucked into the Chinese stratosphere – personally, I don’t think that that is the case.
“We have seen many cases where two countries or regions are highly interdependent on each other – let me reiterate the word interdependence. They are interdependent on each other, like Australia and New Zealand, or Canada and the United States, in terms of trade, but nevertheless, you retain sovereign status without it being seriously challenged.
“But when the same situation appears in this part of the world, people think of Hong Kong in terms of Taiwan. The future between the two sides (Taiwan and the Mainland) is, of course, going to be closer. There will be much closer economic ties between the two countries or regions, and there is nothing unusual about that.” |
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